State selection: Georgia. Sample assembled: 2026-11-22. 20 public questions; this count is not the official exam length. National concepts may be included. Independent learning material, not official exam items or approved education.
Answer key and explanations
1. D — The confinement was within a bounded area with no reasonable means of escape known to the shopper at the time
Restatement (Second) §§ 35–36 require: (1) the defendant intentionally confines the plaintiff, (2) within a bounded area, (3) against plaintiff's will, (4) with no reasonable means of escape the plaintiff knows about. The front exit matters only if the shopper was informed of it — if not, the confinement is complete. The shopkeeper privilege (a conditional defense for reasonable detention of suspected shoplifters) may apply, but the fact-pattern stresses innocence and 45-minute duration, making the confinement's completeness the central issue.
2. B — $150,000 — the coinsurance penalty applies: (600,000 / 800,000) × 200,000 = 150,000
Under the ISO Commercial Property coinsurance condition, recovery equals (limit carried ÷ limit required) × loss, where limit required equals the coinsurance percentage times the property's actual value at time of loss. Here required = 0.80 × $1,000,000 = $800,000; carried = $600,000; ratio = 0.75; loss = $200,000; recovery = $150,000. The Agreed Value option (Optional Coverage) suspends the coinsurance condition when the insured files a Statement of Values and the insurer accepts a limit. Because that option was not activated, the penalty applies. See ISO CP 00 10.
3. D — CG 40 04 bars coverage for property damage arising out of any earth movement, including subsidence, sinking, settling, slipping, caving in, shifting, eroding, mud flow, rising, tilting, or other movement of land — so the third-party PD claim from the operations-caused subsidence is excluded.
ISO CG 40 04 (Exclusion — Earth Movement) bars Coverage A bodily injury and property damage arising out of any earth movement, including subsidence, sinking, settling, slipping, falling away, caving in, shifting, eroding, mud flow, rising, tilting, or lateral or other movement of land. The exclusion sweeps both natural events (earthquakes, naturally-occurring subsidence) and operations-caused events (excavation-induced subsidence, blasting, dewatering, pile-driving). The pipeline contractor's neighbor-PD claim from operations-caused subsidence is excluded. Specialty coverage (Contractors Pollution Liability, Excess Construction Liability, or dedicated subsidence riders) is the market response. Per ISO CG 40 04; CG 34 23 is the identically titled companion form and CG 40 06 is the designated-operations or project version.
4. D — The foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller, and the omission of that alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §2(b) governs design-defect claims under modern federal/Restatement law. The test has two prongs: (1) the foreseeable risks could have been reduced or avoided by adoption of a 'reasonable alternative design' (RAD); and (2) the omission of the RAD renders the product 'not reasonably safe.' This 'risk-utility' or 'reasonable alternative design' framework departs from the older 'consumer-expectations' test of Restatement (Second) §402A cmt i, although §2 cmt g preserves consumer-expectations as relevant evidence within the risk-utility analysis (and a few jurisdictions retain consumer-expectations as a free-standing alternative test). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the RAD's existence and feasibility — typically through expert engineering testimony. Per Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §2(b).
5. B — An employment contract with an employee
The CGL definition of 'insured contract' lists six specific categories: (a) lease of premises, (b) sidetrack agreement, (c) easement/license agreement, (d) obligation to indemnify a municipality required by ordinance, (e) elevator maintenance agreement, and (f) that part of any other contract under which the insured assumes the tort liability of another to pay damages for bodily injury or property damage to a third person. Employment contracts are excluded from the definition because employer's liability is separately addressed by exclusion (e).
6. A — Risk passes when the goods are placed on board the vessel at the named loading port (Hamburg); the seller is obligated to procure minimum cargo insurance (ICC (C) by default under CIF 2020) for the buyer's benefit.
Incoterms 2020 CIF (Cost, Insurance and Freight) is a 'maritime-only' term with a deliberately asymmetric structure: RISK passes from seller to buyer when the goods are placed on board the vessel at the named port of shipment (here, Hamburg), but the seller bears the COST of carriage to the named destination port (New York) and is contractually obligated to procure MINIMUM-cover marine cargo insurance — Institute Cargo Clauses (C) by default under Incoterms 2020 — for the buyer's account. The buyer can require an upgrade to ICC (A) by negotiation. FOB transfers BOTH risk and cost-of-insurance at the same on-board point. Authority: ICC Incoterms 2020 CIF A3/B3/A5.
7. D — Intent to cause harm
Negligence is unintentional conduct falling below the reasonable-person standard. The four required elements are: (1) a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) causation — both cause-in-fact ("but for") and proximate (legal) cause, and (4) actual damages. Intent is the distinguishing element of intentional torts such as battery or conversion, not negligence. Per Restatement (Second) of Torts §282.
8. A — When the property reaches the place where it is finally delivered, so the hand-cart move from the truck is still unloading
The CGL 'loading or unloading' definition follows the complete-operations doctrine: handling of property (a) after it is moved from the place where accepted for movement into or onto the aircraft/watercraft/auto, (b) while it is in or on the vehicle, or (c) while being moved from the vehicle to the place where it is finally delivered. The hand-cart movement to final delivery remains within the loading-and-unloading process. However, the definition expressly excludes movement by a mechanical device — other than a hand truck — that is not attached to the vehicle. A customer's forklift therefore falls outside loading/unloading. Per ISO CG 00 01 §V.
9. C — Forfeits coverage for the settled portion, subject to exceptions — including the insurer's prior unjustified denial of coverage, breach of the duty to defend, conflicts requiring independent action, and bona fide emergencies
Standard ISO commercial general liability and personal liability forms exclude voluntary payments without insurer consent. Restatement (Third) LI §25 enforces the clause generally but recognizes well-established exceptions. The most important exception: where the insurer has wrongfully denied coverage or breached its duty to defend, the insured is freed to settle reasonably and the insurer cannot then assert the no-voluntary-payments defense. This is the 'insurer-breach' or 'Miller-Shugart' exception, recognized in most jurisdictions.
10. C — Automatically increases the policy's liability limits to satisfy the higher state's minimum financial responsibility requirement
The PAP's Out-of-State Coverage provision in Part A automatically reads up the policy's liability limits to meet any higher minimum financial responsibility requirement of the state where the loss occurs, and adds any compulsory no-fault or similar benefits required by that state's law. The provision prevents an insured from being deemed an uninsured motorist merely by crossing a state line. It does not reduce coverage if the destination state's minimums are lower — the policy's own limits remain in force per ISO PP 00 01 Part A.
11. D — Fail if the tenant qualifies as a co-insured or intended beneficiary of the landlord's policy based on the lease and circumstances
The anti-subrogation rule prevents an insurer from stepping into the shoes of its insured to sue a party whom the policy was intended to protect. In landlord-tenant contexts, courts examine whether the parties intended the landlord's property policy to cover the tenant's negligence—looking to the lease, insurance procurement custom, and course of dealing. If the tenant is found to be an intended co-insured or beneficiary of the landlord's policy, the insurer cannot subrogate against the tenant. Whether the tenant is named as an insured does not settle the question; the intended-beneficiary analysis can apply without named-insured status. No federal statute bars subrogation in commercial property fire losses.
12. C — Whether the defendant acted with malice or ill will toward the bystander
The Dillon v. Legg bystander framework, adopted in some form by many jurisdictions, expands NIED beyond the zone-of-danger rule and asks three factors: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident; (2) whether shock resulted from a direct, contemporaneous sensory observance of the injury-producing event; and (3) whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related. Defendant's malice or ill will is not a Dillon factor — NIED rests on negligence, not intent. Some jurisdictions have since tightened these factors into bright-line elements (e.g., Thing v. La Chusa).
13. B — Strict liability for a manufacturing defect (deviation from spec) is imposed without regard to the manufacturer's care or the state of detection technology.
Restatement (Second) §402A(2)(a) applies the rule even though 'the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product' — liability follows from placing a defective product in commerce. A manufacturing defect is a unit that deviated from the manufacturer's own design specifications; the product is defective by comparison to what was intended. Because the standard is deviation-from-spec (not what was knowable), the state-of-the-art defense — which is really a 'we couldn't have known' care-based argument — has no logical purchase against a manufacturing defect claim. State-of-the-art is most relevant to design defect cases.
14. C — A single legal entity whose assets and liabilities are statutorily segregated among cells, shielding each cell's assets from creditors
A Protected Cell Company is a single legal entity authorized by domicile law to maintain separate, statutorily ring-fenced 'cells.' Each cell holds its own assets and underwrites its own risks, and the assets of one cell are insulated from creditors of another and from the core company. This structure lets a sponsor offer cost-effective captive participation to many unrelated insureds without each forming its own captive. SPC is the equivalent term in some offshore jurisdictions.
15. D — Maintenance and Cure
A seaman has three overlapping remedies for injury in the service of the vessel: (1) Maintenance and Cure under general maritime law — a no-fault duty of the shipowner to provide daily living expenses and medical care until maximum medical improvement; (2) Unseaworthiness under general maritime law — a no-fault claim against the vessel owner for any condition rendering the vessel or its appurtenances not reasonably fit for their intended purpose; and (3) Jones Act negligence under 46 USC §30104 — a fault-based claim for the employer's failure of reasonable care, tried to a jury per Jones Act §30104 and GML doctrine.
16. B — Coinsurance penalty applies: recovery = (1,000,000 / 1,200,000) × $200,000 = $166,667 (less deductible); the remaining policy limit is reduced by the amount paid and is NOT automatically reinstated under standard ISO commercial forms
The coinsurance formula is: (carried limit / required limit) × loss, where required limit = value × coinsurance %. Here required = $1,500,000 × 80% = $1,200,000; ratio = $1,000,000 / $1,200,000 = 83.3%; recovery = 83.3% × $200,000 = $166,667 (less deductible). After payment, the remaining policy limit is reduced by the amount paid; standard ISO commercial property forms do NOT automatically reinstate the limit after a partial-loss payment within the policy period. See National-PC-II outline — Coinsurance reductions and re-instatement.
17. D — Access Control — requiring unique user identification, an emergency access procedure, and addressing automatic logoff and the encryption and decryption of electronic PHI
HIPAA Security Rule organizes ePHI protections into three families: Administrative Safeguards (§164.308) covering policies, workforce training, risk analysis, and contingency planning; Physical Safeguards (§164.310) covering facility access, workstation security, and device controls; and Technical Safeguards (§164.312) covering Access Control, Audit Controls, Integrity, Person/Entity Authentication, and Transmission Security. The Access Control standard requires unique user IDs, emergency access procedures, and addresses automatic logoff and encryption/decryption. See HIPAA 45 CFR §164.312(a).
18. C — Earned premium = $87,500; additional premium owed = $37,500
ISO CG 00 01 Section IV Premium Audit condition makes the advance premium a deposit only and requires the first named insured to keep the records needed to compute premium; the Common Policy Conditions let the insurer examine those books during the policy period and up to three years afterward. At expiration, the deposit premium is reconciled against actual exposure. Here: $3,500,000 payroll ÷ 100 × $2.50 = $87,500 earned premium. Subtracting the $50,000 deposit yields $37,500 additional premium billed to the insured. The deposit is not fixed, and the policy's expiring does not cancel the audit obligation. Per ISO CG 00 01 §IV — Premium Audit.
19. B — The court exercises independent judgment under the clause's terms to appoint an umpire who satisfies the competent-and-impartial standard, not bound to either side's nominee
When the two appraisers deadlock on umpire selection, the standard appraisal clause permits either party to petition a court of record to make the appointment. The court is not bound to choose between the parties' nominees; it exercises independent judgment under the policy's articulated standard (competent and impartial, or disinterested). Restatement (Second) of Contracts §227 supports this approach by favoring interpretations that promote fair process and avoid forfeiture. Common practice: the court evaluates qualifications, prior relationships, and conflicts and may select a third candidate entirely, often drawing from a roster of approved appraisers or master commissioners.
20. D — The accident was the type of accident the statute was designed to prevent and the victim was within the class of persons the statute was designed to protect
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §14 codifies the modern negligence-per-se doctrine. Two elements must be satisfied: (1) Type-of-harm — the accident must be the type the statute was designed to prevent; and (2) Class-of-persons — the injured plaintiff must be within the class the statute was designed to protect. Section 15 lists excuses that defeat the per se inference: childhood/disability/incapacity, reasonable diligence in attempting compliance, ignorance of the factual occasion requiring compliance, reasonable confusion about the statute, and compliance posing greater risk than violation. Per Restatement (Third) Torts §14-15.