State selection: Arizona. Sample assembled: 2026-11-22. 20 public questions; this count is not the official exam length. National concepts may be included. Independent learning material, not official exam items or approved education.
Answer key and explanations
1. D — A substantial majority decline to recognize negligent spoliation as an independent tort, relying instead on evidentiary remedies such as adverse-inference instructions and sanctions
Spoliation of evidence — the destruction, alteration, or failure to preserve evidence relevant to pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation — has been the subject of significant jurisdictional disagreement. A substantial majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue decline to recognize negligent spoliation as an independent tort, reasoning that the harm (impaired ability to prove an underlying claim) is too speculative and that existing evidentiary remedies — adverse-inference jury instructions, exclusion of evidence, discovery sanctions, presumptions, and contempt — adequately address the problem. Intentional spoliation by a party or third party has slightly broader acceptance, but jurisdictions remain divided.
2. A — 18 USC §1347 (Health Care Fraud), which reaches any health care benefit program, whether the program is public or private
Added by HIPAA in 1996, 18 USC §1347 criminalizes any knowing and willful scheme to defraud a 'health care benefit program,' a term defined broadly in 18 USC §24(b) to include public programs (Medicare, Medicaid) and any private plan, contract, or policy that provides medical benefits. The 31 USC §3729 False Claims Act, by contrast, requires a claim to a federal program. Sherman §1 targets agreements in restraint of trade and does not fit a unilateral billing-fraud scheme, per 18 USC §1347.
3. A — Net additional fuel, port charges, and stores attributable to the diversion undertaken to save the life of the crew member
Standard P&I Club rules cover diversion expenses — the net additional fuel, port charges, pilotage, tug, and stores incurred by deviating from the scheduled voyage to land an injured or sick crew member, a distressed passenger, or a stowaway, or to comply with quarantine. Lost freight, anticipated profit, and time-charter hire are NOT P&I items (they belong to Loss of Hire / Time-Loss cover). The diversion item is calculated net of expenses that would have been incurred anyway, per the standard P&I Club rule books.
4. C — Binding receipt — coverage attaches immediately and continues until policy issuance or formal declination
The three receipt forms are distinguished by the moment coverage attaches. A binding receipt (common in P&C) gives the applicant immediate temporary coverage as of receipt date and continues until the insurer issues the policy or formally declines the risk. A conditional receipt (common in life) makes coverage retroactive to the application date only if the insurer later determines the applicant was insurable on that date. An approval receipt provides no coverage until the home office affirmatively approves the application. A binder is only temporary evidence of coverage, and many states limit how long one may stay in force.
5. C — A third-party negligence action against the vessel owner for the owner's NEGLIGENCE (not unseaworthiness); the vessel cannot then implead the stevedore for indemnity
Under LHWCA §905(b) (33 USC §905(b)), a longshore worker injured during loading or unloading may, in addition to LHWCA workers' compensation benefits from the stevedoring employer, bring a third-party NEGLIGENCE action against the vessel owner. The 1972 amendments to LHWCA eliminated two doctrines that had operated before: (1) the 'Sieracki seaman' extension of strict unseaworthiness liability to longshoremen working aboard vessels, and (2) the 'Ryan indemnity' under which a vessel owner could shift liability back to the stevedoring employer via implied warranty of workmanlike performance. Now: worker sues vessel for negligence; vessel cannot recover indemnity from the stevedore. Authority: 33 USC §905(b).
6. A — Property damage arising out of declared or undeclared war, civil war, insurrection, rebellion, or revolution.
ISO CG 00 01 exclusion (i) eliminates coverage for bodily injury or property damage arising out of war — whether declared or undeclared — as well as civil war, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, warlike action by a military force, and action taken by governmental authority to hinder or defend against such events. The exclusion reflects the principle that war is a catastrophic, non-fortuitous, non-diversifiable risk that standard CGL pricing cannot absorb. Riots are distinct from insurrection or rebellion and may be covered unless a specific riot exclusion applies. See ISO CG 00 01 exclusion (i).
7. A — BP 04 17 excludes Business Liability for 'employment-related practices' — including refusal to employ, termination, demotion/discipline, harassment, defamation/humiliation, discrimination, and related conduct directed at past/present/prospective employees — meaning the insured needs a separate EPLI policy for this exposure
BP 04 17 Exclusion — Employment-Related Practices is the BOP's mirror of CGL CG 21 47. It bars Business Liability coverage for bodily injury and personal/advertising injury arising out of employment-related practices, policies, acts, or omissions directed at any past, present, or prospective employee — including refusal to employ, termination, demotion/discipline, harassment, evaluation, retaliation, coercion, defamation, humiliation, and discrimination. Once attached, the small-business insured is unprotected against employment-practices suits unless a dedicated EPLI policy is purchased per ISO BP 04 17.
8. C — Extending coverage to losses arising while a covered person is held in the custody of a sovereign government, paramilitary force, or quasi-governmental authority, often excluded as governmental action
Base K&R forms cover kidnap-for-ransom by non-state criminal actors plus extortion and detention by criminal groups. Detention by a sovereign government, paramilitary, insurgent, or quasi-governmental authority typically falls outside this scope (and may be excluded under 'governmental action' wordings). The 'Custody' or 'Wrongful Detention' endorsement extends coverage to these scenarios, paying for response consultant services, legal fees, family support expenses, evacuation costs, and salary continuation for the detained employee. It addresses geopolitical kidnap-equivalent risk where the captor is a state or state-adjacent entity. Per National-PC-IX Specialty Lines — K&R Custody.
9. C — War risks attach as the goods are loaded ON the ocean vessel and terminate as they are discharged FROM the ocean vessel at the final port (the 'waterborne agreement' confines war cover to the waterborne segment); inland transit war exposure must be insured separately.
The Joint Cargo Committee Waterborne Agreement — reflected in Institute War Clauses (Cargo) §3 'Duration' — confines war-risk cover to the waterborne segment of the voyage. Cover ATTACHES as the goods are loaded on the overseas vessel and TERMINATES as they are discharged from the overseas vessel at the final port of discharge (or 15 days after arrival of the vessel at the final discharge port, whichever first occurs). This narrow attachment differs sharply from the main Institute Cargo Clauses, which attach 'warehouse-to-warehouse.' Inland war exposure (pre-shipment cartage, post-discharge transit) must be insured separately under Institute War Clauses (Air Cargo) or land-war endorsements. Authority: Institute War Clauses (Cargo) §3.
10. C — $400 in actual damages plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees; no statutory or punitive damages are available for merely negligent noncompliance.
FCRA §1681o(a), codified at 15 USC §1681o(a), provides a private right of action for negligent — as opposed to willful — noncompliance with FCRA. A prevailing consumer recovers (1) any actual damages sustained, and (2) costs and reasonable attorney's fees. Unlike §1681n (willful liability), §1681o offers no statutory damages floor and no punitive damages. The negligence standard is the ordinary tort standard: failure to exercise reasonable care in complying with FCRA obligations. A consumer suing under §1681o must prove (1) noncompliance with a specific FCRA duty, (2) negligence (failure to use reasonable procedures), (3) actual damages — typically pecuniary loss, denied credit, or emotional distress with supporting evidence, and (4) causation. §1681p sets a 2-year discovery-rule statute of limitations (not to exceed 5 years from the violation).
11. C — State X by default for principal place of business, but because the insured maintains no exposure there the home state becomes the state with the greatest percentage of taxable premium — State Y.
NRRA §527(6), codified at 15 USC §8206, defines 'home state' as the state in which an insured maintains its principal place of business (or principal residence for individuals). However, if 100% of the insured risk is located outside that state, the home state shifts to the state to which the greatest percentage of the insured's taxable premium is allocated. Here, since State X has no portion of the risk, State Y — which bears 100% of the property exposure — is the home state under the fallback rule (NRRA 15 USC §8206).
12. D — A class of persons including the plaintiff, against the particular hazard from which the injury resulted, against the kind of harm suffered, through the type of interest invaded
Restatement (Second) of Torts §286 sets the gatekeeping conditions for borrowing a statute as the negligence standard (negligence per se). All four elements must be satisfied: (1) the plaintiff is within the class the statute was designed to protect, (2) the harm is the kind the statute was designed to prevent, (3) the particular hazard producing the harm was within the statute's contemplation, and (4) the interest invaded is one the statute was designed to safeguard. If any element fails, the statute is irrelevant to the negligence analysis even if defendant violated it. Section 288 then enumerates situations where a statute will NOT be adopted (e.g., regulatory licensing schemes). Per Restatement (Second) of Torts §286.
13. D — Mixed Policy — both voyage (geographic) and time (temporal) limits apply concurrently
Ocean marine policies are classified by duration into three types. (1) VOYAGE POLICY — covers a single defined voyage from named port to named port regardless of time; common for Cargo. (2) TIME POLICY — covers a defined period (typically 12 months) regardless of voyage; common for Hull. (3) MIXED POLICY — combines both, requiring the loss to occur during both the specified voyage AND the specified time window. The fact pattern (Gulf-to-Northern-Europe within 12 months from January 1) layers a geographic voyage limit on a temporal limit, making it a mixed policy. Open Cargo Policies are a different concept — continuous policies with per-shipment declarations.
14. A — It covers the insured's share of an assessment charged by the condo/HOA association during the policy period due to direct loss to collectively-owned property (Section I) or to liability or master-policy coverage gaps (Section II), subject to the increased limit.
Condominium and HOA structures require all unit owners to share assessments levied by the association when a loss exceeds the association's master policy limits or falls within a master-policy deductible. ISO's Loss Assessment Coverage (built into the HO-6 form at a base limit, typically $1,000, and increased via HO 04 35; HO 24 82 is the parallel form addressing earthquake-related assessments where applicable) reimburses the unit owner's pro-rata share. Two prongs: Section I (property) assessments arising from direct loss to collectively-owned property by a covered peril; Section II (liability) assessments arising from occurrences that would have triggered Coverage E. The endorsement increases the limit and may modify perils covered.
15. C — $500,000 — 10% of $60,000,000 is $6,000,000, but for a plan that holds no employer securities the statutory maximum is $500,000.
ERISA section 412 (29 U.S.C. 1112(a)) requires each plan official who handles plan funds to be bonded for at least 10% of the funds handled, measured at the start of the plan year, but in no case less than $1,000 or more than $500,000. The $1,000,000 maximum is substituted only for a plan that holds employer securities or a pooled employer plan. Ten percent of $60,000,000 is $6,000,000, so the $500,000 cap controls here. Option (a) is wrong because $500,000 is the ceiling, not a floor (the floor is $1,000); option (b) ignores the cap; option (d) is wrong because the bonding rule covers defined-contribution plans such as a 401(k) as well.
16. A — Solely to the home state of the insured, which alone may require payment of premium tax on the entire multi-state nonadmitted placement.
Dodd-Frank Title V Subtitle B (NRRA), codified at 15 USC §8201, reverses the pre-2010 patchwork in which every state where a risk was located could demand a slice of surplus-lines premium tax. The statute provides that 'no State other than the home State of an insured may require any premium tax payment for nonadmitted insurance.' Home state is defined as the state of the insured's principal place of business (or principal residence for individuals), with a fallback rule when no exposure is located there (NRRA 15 USC §8201).
17. C — A fiduciary must act in accordance with plan documents insofar as they are consistent with ERISA; where the SPD conflicts with the plan, the plan generally controls, though CIGNA v. Amara may permit equitable reformation or surcharge.
ERISA §404(a)(1) imposes four cumulative fiduciary duties: loyalty (A), prudence (B), diversification (C), and adherence to plan documents (D). Subsection (D), codified at 29 USC §1104(a)(1)(D), requires the fiduciary to act 'in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with [ERISA].' When a summary plan description conflicts with the formal plan document, the formal plan controls under CIGNA v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011), but participants may pursue equitable remedies including reformation, equitable estoppel, or surcharge under §502(a)(3) (ERISA 29 USC §1104(a)(1)(D)).
18. C — Yacht policy (ocean marine) — combined Hull, Protection & Indemnity, Medical Payments, Uninsured Boater, and Pollution coverage
The market convention divides pleasure craft into two product lines at roughly the 26-foot length mark. Boats under 26 feet are written on inland marine 'boatowners' policies, while 26 feet and longer (yachts) move to ocean marine yacht policies. The yacht form combines Hull (physical damage to the vessel), Protection & Indemnity (third-party liability and crew exposure), Medical Payments, Uninsured Boater, and Pollution coverage in a single package.
19. C — Concealment by half-truth — a technically true answer rendered misleading by withheld material context
Concealment is the silent withholding of a material fact the applicant has a duty to disclose. The 'half-truth' variant arises when an answer is technically correct (no paid loss occurred) yet omits context (arson investigations on the same property) that a reasonable underwriter would treat as material to risk evaluation. Outside marine insurance, most U.S. courts do not make an applicant volunteer facts nobody asked about, and pure silence usually defeats coverage only if it was meant to deceive. A half-truth is different: once the applicant answers on a subject, a literally accurate but misleading answer is treated like a misrepresentation, which in many states supports rescission if it is material.
20. C — Indemnify the indemnitee for ALL losses — including those caused by the indemnitee's sole negligence
The classic taxonomy classifies indemnity provisions by how much fault the indemnitor assumes for the indemnitee. Type I, broad-form, requires the indemnitor to defend and pay the indemnitee even when the indemnitee was solely negligent. Type II, intermediate-form, applies where the parties were jointly negligent — indemnitor covers the indemnitee for any portion of loss not caused solely by the indemnitee. Type III, limited-form, restricts indemnity to losses caused by the indemnitor's own negligence. Many jurisdictions have anti-indemnity statutes restricting Type I (and sometimes Type II) in construction contracts.